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Essay
A Tale of Two Searches: Intrusive Civil Discovery
Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment
CHAD DEVEAUX

In this Essay, I argue that civil discovery rules compelling the
production of private papers violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches. A “search” occurs
when a government agent intrudes upon a sphere in which society
recognizes “a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Implicit in this
definition is an affinity for private papers such as letters and diaries.
Creators of such media possess a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their contents. Thus, when police seek to examine such documents
to look for evidence of crime, they usually must obtain a search
warrant. For the warrant to issue, the police must establish
probable cause. Conversely, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and parallel state provisions, all a litigant needs to do to
“unlock the doors of discovery” is file a complaint endowed with
“well-pleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” When this modest obligation is met, the
Federal Rules direct courts to compel the production of any papers
sought that are “relevant to the claim or defense of any party.” No
detail is too intimate to shield it from scrutiny. Courts even
routinely order the production of personal diaries. I assert that to
pass constitutional muster such orders, like search warrants, must
be premised on a showing of probable cause.
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A Tale of Two Searches: Intrusive Civil Discovery
Rules Violate the Fourth Amendment
CHAD DEVEAUX*
“[T]he power for the most massive invasion into private
papers and private information is available to anyone willing
to take the trouble to file a civil complaint. A foreigner
watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would
never suspect that this country has a highly-prized tradition
of privacy enshrined in the fourth amendment.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A common cultural trope posits that just societies invariably
promulgate a set of foundational premises prefaced by a benevolent “rule
number one.”2 This rule embodies the Volksgeist of the community.3 It
establishes the benchmark the society uses to judge its leaders. Rule
number one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and parallel
state provisions charge the judiciary with “secur[ing] the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”4 By every
*

Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Concordia University School of Law; LL.M.,
Harvard Law School; J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School. I am gratefully indebted to my
student, Craig Cannon, who suggested the title for this Essay. I also thank Professors Andy Kim, Jack
McMahon, and Joe Tomain for providing thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I thank Kerry
Lohmeier and Anne Mostad-Jensen of Concordia’s Law Library for their invaluable assistance
researching this Essay, and the editors and staff of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work
preparing it for publication. Any mistakes are mine.
1
Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976).
2
See, e.g., Matthew 22:34–40 (New American Bible) (“You shall love the Lord, your God with
all thy heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first
commandment. The second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. The whole law and the
prophets depend on these two commandments.”).
3
The Volksgeist is “the historically developed legal consciousness of a particular people.” Arthur
E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. REV. 389, 398 (1964).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 1. While I refer to the FRCP throughout this Essay, my critiques are equally
directed at the states and the District of Columbia, as the overwhelming majority of American
jurisdictions have codified the FRCP virtually verbatim, including Rule 1. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 1
(construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”);
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding”); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action”); ARK. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 1.5 (construing rules
“liberally . . . to ensure the just and speedy determination of the proceedings that they govern”);
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objective measure, our courts have fallen spectacularly short of this goal.5
Several factors contribute to public dissatisfaction with our courts,
including docket congestion,6 legislative underfunding,7 and the inefficient

COLO. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action”); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every proceeding”); D.C. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 (same);
HAW. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”); IND. R. TRIAL PROC. R. 1 (construing
rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-102 (West 2010) (construing rules “liberally . . . to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding”); MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); MISS. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); MONT. R. CIV. P. 1
(construing rules to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”); NEB. CT. R. PLDG. § 6-1101; NEV. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”); N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-001 (construing rules “to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”); N.D. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing
rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”);
OHIO R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules to “eliminat[e] delay, unnecessary expense and all other
impediments to . . . justice”); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action”); S.C. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 15-6-1
(construing rules “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action”);
TENN. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 (calling for rules “to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial
adjudication . . . . [w]ith as great expedition and dispatch and at the least expense”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 1
(construing rules “liberally . . . to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action”); VT. R. CIV. P. 1 (construing rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action”); WASH. CIV. R. 1 (same); W.V. R. CIV. P. 1 (same); WYO. R. CIV. P. 1 (same).
5
See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, All Right, Retired Judges, Write!, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 227,
233 (2006) (lamenting the FRCP’s failure “to live up to their promise to deliver a ‘just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action’” ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule
37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”: More Bark than Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 131 (2011) (arguing
that courts’ systemic failure to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct “undermines the very reason
for the Federal Rules’ existence—‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 310 (1986) (noting criticism that the FRCP have failed “to achieve
[their] self-proclaimed goal of ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of controversies”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1040 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme
Court failed in interpreting the FRCP by not reading them actively in light of Rule 1).
6
See, e.g., Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing
the Federal Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–3 (1997) (documenting
vast increases in federal appellate congestion, pondering its causes, and noting its deleterious effects);
Rifkind, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that courts’ caseloads are “increasing at a pace far beyond the
growth in population”).
7
See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, Do We Have 18th Century Courts for the 21st Century?, 100 KY.
L.J. 833, 833 (2012) (calling the court-funding crisis “potentially devastating” and a “crisis in a stream
of crises”); Paul J. De Muniz, The Invisible Branch: Funding Resilient Courts Through Public
Relations, Institutional Identity, and a Place on the “Public Radar,” 100 KY. L.J. 807, 807 (2012)
(“State courts . . . are struggling under prolonged budget cuts severe enough to jeopardize judicial
infrastructure and constitutional democracy.”).
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allocation of judicial resources. But the primary impediment to the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes lies in the FRCP’s
expansive discovery devices or, more precisely, in their abuse.9 Discovery,
as any experienced litigator can profess, “is war,”10 and not just any war,
mind you. Discovery is a “war of attrition.”11
Originally conceived as a shield against obfuscation,12 the FRCP’s
expansive discovery devices have become “a weapon capable of imposing
large and unjustifiable costs on one’s adversary”13 and a tool enabling
unethical litigants to “stonewall[] for no purpose other than to
deplete . . . resources and enlarge . . . billable time.”14
Scholarly criticism of the modern discovery regime is legion.
Commentators have sacrificed untold forests lamenting its economic
costs.15 But comparatively little ink has been spilled exploring the
extensive invasion of personal privacy entailed by the reach of
contemporary document production rules.16 As the late federal judge
8
See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 6, at 3–9 (describing the dearth of specialized courts, glut caused
by statutory appeals, underemployment of alternative-resolution procedures, lack of “jumbo” courts of
appeals, and outmoded appellate opinions as the key culprits in judicial inefficiency); Rifkind, supra
note 1, at 105 (arguing that probate courts are a waste of judicial resources, as much of the work is
uncontested).
9
See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (decrying a “significant
potential for abuse” given the “liberality of pretrial discovery”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989) (providing data on the widespread recognition of discovery
problems by federal judges); Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 357, 365 (2006) (noting that in the American scheme, parties, rather than courts,
have primary control over discovery); Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (noting that the promulgation of the FRCP massively
dilated the scope of discovery); Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) (noting that “American federal discovery provides for
more liberal discovery than any other legal system in the world”); Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107 (calling
the discovery process “an endurance contest” that proceeds without “serious regulation”); John K.
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and
Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 579–86 (1989) (using a protracted examination of game theory
to show that abusive “impositional” requests will proliferate under the FRCP); see also Russell J.
Weintraub, Critique of the Hazard-Taruffo Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J.
413, 420 (1998) (noting that disapproval of U.S. discovery practices extends internationally).
10
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 635; accord Setear, supra note 9, at 579.
11
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 635.
12
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500–01 (1947) (comparing the illuminating effects of the
discovery rules to the opacity present under the prior federal procedures).
13
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 636.
14
Douglas M. Branson, Book Review, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 459, 460 (1998).
15
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 636 (remarking that “[l]itigants with weak cases
have . . . every reason to heap costs on” their opposition to coerce settlement “on favorable terms”); id.
at 637 (“The party in a position to threaten exhaustive discovery can claim for itself in settlement a
portion of the costs that should not have been imposed in the first place.”).
16
But see Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-Based Theory of Civil
Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 808 (2005) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
mandates that discovery not be ordered where the basic element of relevancy is lacking.”); Rifkind,
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Simon Rifkind observed, “[T]he power for the most massive invasion into
private papers and private information is available to anyone willing to
take the trouble to file a civil complaint.”17
This expansive power stands in sharp contrast with that afforded to law
enforcement. As Justice Brandeis famously observed:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.18
When it comes to matters of personal privacy, ours is both an “age of
wisdom” and an “age of foolishness.”19 In the context of criminal
investigations—where public interest in ascertaining the truth is the
highest20—twentieth-century courts became zealous defenders of the right
to be let alone.21 Yet during the same period, they wholly eviscerated the
right to privacy in civil litigation.22 In the civil arena nothing is sacred, no
detail too intimate to shield it from scrutiny. For example, “courts . . . have
routinely ordered the production of personal diaries in response to requests
supra note 1, at 107 (arguing that document production orders facilitate unreasonable invasions of
privacy); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984) (“[D]iscovery . . . may
seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties.”).
17
Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107.
18
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972) (quoting Justice Brandeis’s text approvingly); Katz,
389 U.S. at 350 (finding that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds
of governmental intrusion”).
19
CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 5 (Richard Maxwell ed., Penguin Books 2000)
(1859).
20
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(2006) (“The [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule generates ‘substantial social costs,’ which
sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (citation omitted) (quoting United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))).
21
See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“[The Fourth] Amendment protects individual privacy against
certain kinds of governmental intrusion.”). But see David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a
Parallel Universe: Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 659, 698–99 (2007) (arguing that the Roberts Court has deliberately eroded some Fourth
Amendment protections recognized in the latter half of the twentieth century).
22
See Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107 (explaining how civil litigation undermines personal privacy).
The Rules Enabling Act empowers the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings
before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012). Utilizing this
power, the Court promulgated the FRCP in 1938. Houben v. Telular Corp., 309 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th
Cir. 2002).
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for production of documents.”
Worse, many courts recognize a
“presumption that discovery materials . . . are open to public inspection,”
and permit the dissemination of such information to the media.24
This discontinuity in matters of personal privacy represents more than
just a curious paradox to be explored by academics.25 It violates the
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects “papers” from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”26 At the beating heart of the Fourth
Amendment lies a fundamental respect for the “dignity, and security of
persons.”27 To that end, the Amendment limits the ability of government
agents to make intrusions into “sphere[s] in which society recognizes
reasonable expectations of privacy.”28 Informed by both “historical

23
Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A. 98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); see, e.g.,
Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008)
(ordering production of diary to reveal plaintiff’s “most private thoughts and feelings”); Zakrzewska v.
New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008) (allowing
discovery of diary to undermine expert witness testimony); Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354,
360–62 (D. Colo. 2004) (requiring production of thirty-four enumerated diary passages over plaintiff’s
objections to support plaintiff’s prior voluntary diary submissions), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.3d
1170 (10th Cir. 2007); Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515, 1998 WL 341812, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill.
June 12, 1998) (mandating six specific diary disclosures relevant to dispute); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ.
of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing discovery of diary when “undue annoyance,
embarrassment, and oppression” was unlikely due to a confidentiality stipulation); Dogan Enters., Inc.
v. Hubsher, No. CV-84-3984, 1987 WL 20312, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1987) (ordering diary
production in an accounting case); Eidukonis v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 86-5142, 1987 WL 9286, at
*2–3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1987) (ordering production when diarist failed to stress personal nature of
diary); Zises v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 112 F.R.D. 223, 224–25, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing a
plaintiff’s claim after a refusal to produce diaries); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D.
616, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (allowing possibility of diary production after in-camera review); ChangCraft v. Cameron, No. 3AN-05-13737 CI, 2006 WL 6886441, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2006)
(ordering production of a diary but limiting scope of inspection); Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d
93, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (allowing admission of a diary obtained by improper means when party
“would have been entitled to its production”); Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 369
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (remanding with order for in-camera review of a diary by lower court);
Hollingworth v. Hollingworth, 145 P.2d 466, 466–67 (Ore. 1944) (using a diary to indict defendant’s
“loose morals and overindulgence in alcohol”).
24
Mathias v. Jacobs, 197 F.R.D. 29, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D.
295, 297–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Nev. 1990).
25
The discontinuity may stem from the fact that “the literatures of criminal procedure and
constitutional law do not speak to one another, and the cases do not cite each other.” William J. Stuntz,
Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1016–17 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613 (1989).
28
United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 1991); see California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person
has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring))); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (“[T]here is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
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practices” and prevailing “social norms,” the Fourth Amendment
embodies a particularly deep respect for the high expectation of privacy
inherent in private papers.31 For this reason, the Fourth Amendment’s text
accords “papers” special protection.32
Yet civil litigants seeking access to an opponent’s private papers face
little scrutiny. Judge Rifkind imagined that “[a] foreigner watching the
discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect that this country
has a highly-prized tradition of privacy enshrined in the fourth
amendment.”33 The FRCP empowers litigants to demand the production of
private papers from opponents—and even third parties—virtually as a
matter of right.34 As Justice Murphy noted, bestowing a private party with
the power “to demand the books and papers of an individual is an open
invitation to abuse that power.”35
In this Essay, I argue that the judicially compelled production of one’s
private papers constitutes a quintessential Fourth Amendment search. I
assert that to pass constitutional muster, document production orders
seeking private papers should be premised on a showing of probable cause:
a showing by the moving party that “there is a fair probability” that the
papers sought will yield admissible evidence.36 In determining whether the
movant has satisfied her burden, courts should independently evaluate the
allegations offered, probing “the veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge” of the source.37 Allegations premised upon the naked surmise
29
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to
embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”).
30
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion).
31
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters . . . are in the general
class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy . . . .”); United States
v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should have’ a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp.
503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))); James A. McKenna, The
Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND.
L.J. 55, 68 (1978) (arguing that private papers “should occupy a type of preferred position” under the
Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Email is
the technological scion of tangible mail . . . . [and] requires strong protection under the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
32
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33
Rifkind, supra note 1, at 107.
34
See Erichson, supra note 9, at 365 (“What is extraordinary about United States discovery . . . is
not only its breadth, but also the extent to which it is controlled by the parties rather than the court.”).
35
Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
36
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
37
United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United States v. Hodge,
354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004) (considering the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons who
supplied information that formed the basis for a search warrant affidavit); United States v. Davis, 313
F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (evaluating the validity of a search warrant affidavit based on an
“informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge,” among other factors).
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of “information and belief” will not suffice.
This Essay continues with four Parts. Part II explores the Supreme
Court’s evolving conception of what constitutes a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. I assert that the compelled production of private
papers, such as diaries, letters, and e-mails, constitutes a search because the
authors of such documents possess a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
in their contents.39
Part III addresses the level of scrutiny required to render the search of
private papers reasonable. I argue that the limitations imposed by the
FRCP are insufficient because they do not require a showing of probable
cause—the standard which provides the ordinary measure of
reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes.40
Part IV explores how the Supreme Court’s probable-cause
jurisprudence, developed for the issuance of search warrants, may be
tailored to fit the field of pre-trial discovery. I contend that a litigant
seeking the production of private papers—like a constable seeking a search
warrant—should bear the burden of establishing that “there is a fair
probability” that the documents sought will yield admissible evidence.41
While far more burdensome than the FRCP’s current regime, probable
cause is “a standard well short of absolute certainty” that a majority of
litigants will be able to satisfy.42 This standard will prevent current abuses
because its satisfaction requires litigants to identify the basis of their
knowledge.43 Allegations premised on information and belief will not
suffice.
Finally, Part V argues that when the compelled disclosure of private
papers is deemed reasonable, courts should issue protective orders
preventing the public disclosure of information obtained that is not
admitted into evidence.44 Litigants will inevitably “obtain—incidentally or
purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly

38
See Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (noting that “information and
belief” allegations fall short of demonstrating “probable cause”); Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137,
141 (Ill. 1928) (same).
39
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (acknowledging that the determination of
whether a search occurred must, by necessity, turn on whether a person had a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” in regard to the subject matter of the search).
40
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013).
41
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39.
42
Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam).
43
United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. McClellan, 165
F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1996).
44
The First Amendment requires that private papers actually received into evidence be made
available to the public. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586–88 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment prohibits judicial restraints on media coverage of
trials).
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released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.” When based on a
showing of probable cause, such intrusions are justified by the judicial
system’s “interest in determination of truth.”46 But I assert that the
humiliation caused by such intrusions should not be amplified by allowing
unnecessary exposure of the private information.
II. CIVIL DOCUMENT PRODUCTION ORDERS CONSTITUTE “SEARCHES”
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment’s ambit is limited to searches and seizures,
“legal term[s] of art whose history is riddled with complexity.”47 Further,
the Amendment “proscrib[es] only governmental action; it is wholly
inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by
a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official.’”48 Thus, my
thesis is premised upon the threshold conclusions that the court-ordered
production of private papers constitutes “governmental action” and that
such action amounts to a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
A. The Court-Ordered
Governmental Action

Production

of

Documents

Constitutes

The Supreme Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan49
that the Bill of Rights applies with equal vigor to legislative and judicial
action.50 In Sullivan, the respondent argued that the First Amendment was
inapplicable to a common law defamation action between private parties
because the Amendment “is directed against [governmental] action and not
private action.”51 The Court rejected this contention:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
45

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
47
Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001)); see Walsh v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 4586(NRB), 2001 WL
83221, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001) (noting that “what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ search or seizure for
Fourth Amendment purposes is often a complex question that has led to voluminous case law”).
48
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
49
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
50
Id. at 291–92; see also Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1217 (9th Cir. 2003) (“State power
may be exercised as much by a . . . judge’s . . . application of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by
a statute.” (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996))).
51
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
46
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constitutional freedoms . . . . It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action . . . . The test is not the form in
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.52
Civil discovery orders are no different. Discovery is the “coerced
production of information”53 and it is backed by the full coercive power of
the State. “If a litigant fails to comply with an appropriate discovery
request, the Court may have to interject itself and order compliance,
enforceable by the court’s contempt powers. Thus, there is government
compulsion involved.”54 As such, document production orders constitute a
form of governmental action implicating the Constitution. But the
question remains whether the government conduct involved constitutes a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.55
B. The Compelled Production of Private Papers Falls Within the Supreme
Court’s Definition of “Search”
1.

Nineteenth-Century Precedent Recognized that Document
Production Orders Constitute Fourth Amendment Searches

Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was bound by the shackles of property law. Modern notions
of privacy were foreign to criminal procedure.56 A “search” simply meant
“a quest by an officer of the law” for property and a “seizure” was “a
forcible dispossession of” that property from its possessor by the
government.57
Implicit in this property-centric view of searches and seizures was a
limitation quite foreign to modern jurists. Case law of this era recognized
52

Id. (citing Ex parte Virgina, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880)).
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1984).
54
Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17,
2008) (citing Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 30).
55
Because document production usually involves the production of duplicates, the Fourth
Amendment’s seizure clause is not ordinarily implicated. But see Cooper, supra note 16, at 789–806
(arguing that the coerced production of documents constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking).
56
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (noting that nineteenth-century Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was rooted in
property rights, not privacy).
57
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). Until the mid-twentieth-century, the Supreme Court
defined a Fourth Amendment search as a common-law trespass committed by a government actor upon
one’s “person, . . . house, . . . papers or . . . effects.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464
(1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967). The Supreme Court recently recognized that such trespasses—along with certain invasions of
privacy—still constitute Fourth Amendment “searches.” See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52 (noting that
the modern “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test” for whether a search has occurred “has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”).
53
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a:
[D]istinction between merely evidentiary materials, on the
one hand, which [could] not be seized . . . under the authority
of a search warrant . . . and on the other hand, those objects
which [could] validly be seized including the
instrumentalities and means by which a crime [was]
committed, the fruits of crime such as stolen property,
weapons . . . and [contraband].58
Possession of so-called “mere evidence”59—items that tend to link an
individual with a crime but that are not contraband, an instrumentality, or a
fruit of crime—is perfectly legal.60 Because a search for or seizure of such
property interferes with the owner’s use and enjoyment of it, Supreme
Court precedent regarded such acts as per se unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.61 Conversely, the Court viewed the
government to possess “a superior property interest” in illegal subject
matter like contraband.62 Hence, government searches for or seizures of
such property were deemed reasonable.63 But absent this requisite superior
claim of title, the government could not use a search warrant to “gain[]
access to a man’s house . . . and papers solely for the purpose of making a
search to secure evidence to be used against him in a . . . proceeding.”64
Pursuant to the mere evidence rule, virtually “all government attempts
to procure a person’s private papers were unconstitutional under . . . the
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.”65 This was so because
with the exception of documents that are the instrumentalities of crime,
such as “stolen or forged papers,” papers almost always qualify as mere
evidence.66 Because the government lacks “a superior property interest” in
documents lawfully in the possession of their owner, it could not search for
them.67
During the mere evidence rule’s reign, the Supreme Court confronted
several statutes authorizing federal agencies to subpoena documents from
58
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623 (1886)).
59
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd, 116
U.S. at 623–24).
60
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
61
See id. (stating that the search and seizure of the accused’s property is only valid if possession
of the property by the accused is unlawful).
62
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
63
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309.
64
Id.
65
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 622 (1886)).
66
Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309 (citing Langdon v. People, 24 N.E. 874, 877 (Ill. 1890)).
67
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304.
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parties they were tasked with regulating. On each occasion, the Court
condemned the law as an attempt “to direct fishing expeditions into private
papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.”68 In
1886, the Court held in Boyd v. United States69 that “any compulsory
discovery by . . . compelling the production of [one’s] private books and
papers . . . is contrary to the principles of a free government . . . and . . .
obnoxious to the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment.”70
Twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel,71 the Court backtracked slightly,
holding that “an order for the production of books and papers may
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment.”72 Hale acknowledged that with respect to corporations,
some documents could be discoverable because a “corporation is a creature
of the State,” and as a condition of incorporation, the State “reserve[s] [a]
right . . . to investigate” certain papers to “find out whether [the
corporation] has exceeded its powers.”73 But the Court adhered to the view
that “the compulsory extortion of a man’s . . . private papers” generally
constitutes “an unreasonable search and seizure . . . within the Fourth
Amendment.”74
While the Supreme Court would not apply the Fourth Amendment to
state governments for another half century,75 state courts similarly
construed their own constitutions to prohibit the forced disclosure of
private papers, even in civil litigation.76 Reversing a lower court’s finding
of contempt for a litigant’s refusal to comply with an order to produce
documents during trial, the California Supreme Court noted: “A man does
68
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924); accord Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631–32 (1886).
69
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70
Id. at 631–32. Boyd also rested on a second, now-discredited ground: that the coerced
production of one’s papers violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled selfincrimination. Id. at 630. The Court reasoned that “any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s
own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
goods, [was] within the condemnation of [an English] judgment” describing analogous philosophical
principles. Id. The Court concluded that “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other.” Id. The Court laid this notion to rest in Andresen v. Maryland, finding that the admission of a
defendant’s papers against him as evidence did not violate the Fifth Amendment because government
actors did not compel him to create the papers. 427 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1976).
71
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
72
Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
73
Id. at 74–75.
74
Id. at 71.
75
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause makes the privacy provisions of the Fourth Amendment applicable to state
governments).
76
E.g., McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 159 P.2d 944, 950–51 (Cal. 1945); Ex parte
Clarke, 58 P. 546, 548 (Cal. 1899); Red Star Lab. Co. v. Pabst, 194 N.E. 734, 735 (Ill. 1935); Carden v.
Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928); Morrison v. Sturges, 26 How. Pr. 177, 177–78 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1863).
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not lose all his civil rights because he is brought into court as a party to a
suit.”77
This precedent gave way in 1967 when the Supreme Court abandoned
the mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden.78 Hayden found that midtwentieth-century case law had come to recognize “that the principal object
of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property,
and ha[d] . . . discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property
Consistent with this new conception of the Fourth
concepts.”79
Amendment, the Court held that the reasonableness of a search rests not on
who has “superior” interest in the property sought, but whether the means
the government uses to acquire it impermissibly intrudes upon privacy.80
The Court reasoned that “[t]he requirement that the Government
assert . . . some property interest in material it seizes, has long been a
fiction, obscuring the reality that government has an interest in solving
crime.”81 The Court concluded that “[t]he requirements of the Fourth
Amendment can secure the same protection of privacy whether the search
is for ‘mere evidence’ or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband.”82
The demise of the mere evidence rule led lower courts to conclude that
Boyd and Hale had been “wounded . . . mortally.”83 Hence, modern courts
have uniformly held that the FRCP’s coerced document production devices
do not offend the Constitution.84 This new conception is too clever by half.
I do not advocate a return to the misguided mere evidence rule.
77

Ex parte Clarke, 58 P. at 548.
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
79
Id. at 304.
80
Id. at 304–06.
81
Id. at 306 (footnote omitted).
82
Id. at 306–07. Some commentators have greeted Hayden’s renunciation of the mere evidence
rule with incredulity. See Greg S. Sergienko, Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys, 2 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 64 (1996), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v2i1/sergienko.html (“Warden v. Hayden,
in which the Supreme Court discerned a “shift in emphasis from property to privacy” in Fourth
Amendment rights, significantly eroded protection against governmental searches and seizures.”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304)).
83
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. United States v. Sasson, 334
F. Supp. 2d 347, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Boyd set out the now discredited ‘mere evidence’ rule . . . .”);
United States v. Braswell, 436 F. Supp. 669, 672 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (“Suffice it to say, this ‘mere
evidence’ rule . . . has been wholly abrogated by the Supreme Court . . . .”).
84
See, e.g., Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183, 184–86 (9th Cir. 1964) (rejecting argument
that subpoena seeking papers constituted a Fourth Amendment search); Gen. Petrol. Corp. v. Dist.
Court of the U.S. for Western Dist. of Wash., 213 F.2d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that
compliance with FRCP guidelines rendered document production order reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes); Rekeweg v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 437–38 (N.D. Ind. 1961)
(finding that documents sought were “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence” and defeated the defendant’s assertion that production demand constituted “unreasonable
search and seizure”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 57, 58 (D.N.Y. 1939) (finding
mere “showing of materiality” by party demanding documents sufficient to render production order
reasonable under Fourth Amendment), rev’d on other grounds, 334 U.S. 258 (1948).
78
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Documents can be evidence of wrongdoing and, as such, the government
has an interest in obtaining them. But Hayden’s renunciation of the rule
was not a rejection of the notion that “an order for the production of books
and papers may” qualify as a “search . . . within the Fourth Amendment.”85
The Court simply recognized that the government’s reasonable search of
private papers is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.86 Unbroken
precedent—both before and after Hayden—demonstrates that such conduct
constitutes a search.87
2.

Individuals Possess a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” in
Their Private Papers

The Supreme Court formally abandoned its property-centric view of
the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.88 Recognizing that the
Amendment “protects people, not places,”89 Katz stands for the proposition
that a search occurs when a government agent intrudes upon “sphere[s] in
which society recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.”90 In other
words, a search ordinarily involves government encroachment on mediums
that “tend to be the locus of activities that most people like to keep
secret.”91 Document production demands frequently constitute such an
intrusion.
While many documents entail no expectation of privacy and thus
trigger no Fourth Amendment concerns—letters to the editor, for
example92—production orders often compel disclosure of private papers
revealing the writer’s innermost confidences.93 E-mails,94 text messages,95

85

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306–07.
87
See infra Part II.B.2.
88
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89
Id. at 351.
90
United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
91
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1016; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated
to others.”).
92
A writer would not have an expectation of privacy with respect to such a letter because “an
individual does not have an expectation of privacy in items exposed to the public.” Filarsky v. Delia,
132 S. Ct. 1657, 1668 (2012) (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d
1069, 1099 (9th Cir. 2010)).
93
In my view, only the compelled production of “private papers” constitutes a “search” for Fourth
Amendment purposes. While “private papers” elude simple classification, consistent with Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, I would define the term to include all documents in which the writer enjoys
a reasonable expectation of privacy—e.g., private letters, e-mails, text messages, and diaries. See
McKenna, supra note 31, at 55 n.1 (“Those papers having a close relationship to an individual’s
personality, especially to the private aspects of personality, are clearly ‘private.’”). It should be noted
that the standard I advocate would apply with much greater vigor to individuals than to corporations.
86

1098

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
96

[Vol. 46:1083

97

love letters, and even diaries are the regular targets of production
orders. In the criminal justice arena, precedent recognizes the obvious: It
is beyond cavil that creators of such media possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents.98 For this reason, the Fourth
Amendment expresses a special affinity for private papers, and explicitly
calls for their protection.99 Precedent recognizes that “[t]he privacy of
private books and papers is . . . of inestimable value to the owner on
account of . . . personal and sentimental reasons.”100
An individual’s papers are “little more than an extension of [her]
person.”101 Intrusion into “private files” inherently yields “exposure of
[the writer’s] intimacies and confidences.”102 As such, jurists have long
recognized that “papers are almost inseparable from the privacy and
security of the individual.”103 As Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
famously observed, “[t]he principle which protects personal writings” from
public scrutiny is “that of an inviolate personality.”104 Thus, “the act of
reading someone’s correspondence” is regarded as a “paradigmatic
infringement . . . of privacy.”105
The protection of papers from government scrutiny was historically
“bound up” with the “struggle for freedom of speech” in England.106
English authorities frequently sought the private writings of suspected
dissidents, using “the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system
94
E.g., Miller v. Citgo Ref. & Chem. Co. LP, No. C-11-22, 2012 WL 113781, at *9–11 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 13, 2012); Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 684 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
95
E.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 268 F.R.D. 279, 288 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Rodriguez v. City of
Fresno, Nos. 105CV0661OWWDLB, 105CV01017OWWDLB, 2006 WL 2067063, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
July 24, 2006).
96
E.g., Peacock v. Merrill, No. CA 05-0377-BH-C, 2008 WL 176375, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Ala. Jan.
17, 2008); McFarland v. McFarland, 107 A.2d 615, 616–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954).
97
See cases cited supra note 23.
98
See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed
packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of
privacy . . . .”); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–85 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing a
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 771
(9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages); In re Application of
U.S. for a Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he diary’s author enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.”);
United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should
have’ a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v.
Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))).
99
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100
Ex parte Clarke, 58 P. 546, 547 (Cal. 1899).
101
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
102
State v. Bisaccia, 213 A.2d 185, 192 (N.J. 1965).
103
Id. at 191.
104
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 91, at 205.
105
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1021.
106
Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop., 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961).
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107

for the suppression” of dissenters.
Similarly, it is widely documented
that well-heeled litigants often file meritless Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation (“SLAPP” suits) to quell dissent.108 Such suits deploy
the FRCP’s expansive discovery provisions as a weapon to deter “citizens
from exercising their political rights or to punish them for having done
so.”109
Evidence of the preferred status enjoyed by private papers predates the
Fourth Amendment itself. Lord Camden recognized the fundamental
privacy interests implicit in one’s papers in his 1765 opinion, Entick v.
Carrington.110 The Supreme Court recently characterized Entick as “a
monument of English freedom undoubtedly familiar to every American
statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be
the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search
and seizure.”111 Noting that private papers “are often the dearest property a
man can have,”112 Entick contended—somewhat hyperbolically—that
empowering agents of the state to examine “a man’s private letters of
correspondence, family concerns, [or] trade and business” without showing
probable cause would be a “monstrous” invasion of personal privacy
“worse than the Spanish Inquisition.”113
Yet, the FRCP empowers private litigants to gain access to opponents’
and third parties’ private papers with little difficulty.114 Remarkably, the
public and the courts have accepted this status quo as a fact of modern life.
When asked whether she kept a diary, then-First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton famously replied, “Heavens no! It could get subpoenaed. I can’t
write anything down.”115 A perusal of precedent shows that Mrs. Clinton’s
fears were well founded. “[C]ourts . . . have routinely ordered the
production of personal diaries in response to requests for production of
documents.”116
Federal and state reporters are littered with decisions that casually
107

Id.
See, e.g., George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3–6 (1989) (noting countless SLAPP suits have been filed to exploit the expense and
emotional distress of civil litigation in order to chill victims and others from speaking out).
109
Id. at 5–6.
110
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P.).
111
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S.
593, 596 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817–18.
113
Id. at 812.
114
See infra Part III.
115
Newsmaker: Hillary Rodham Clinton (PBS Newshour television broadcast May 28, 1996),
transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june96/hillaryclinton_0528.html.
116
Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A. 98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); see also
cases cited supra note 23.
108
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reveal diary writers’ “most private thoughts and feelings.”
Examples
include the discussion of entries concerning “on-and-off relationship[s],”118
sexual encounters,119 physical assaults,120 stream of conscious
ruminations,121 “observations and musings” concerning the “perplexing
transition from adolescence to adulthood,”122 and writers’ supposed “loose
morals.”123
Defendants124 and plaintiffs125 alike are subject to this indignity.126 A
constable pursuing a suspected murderer or rapist enjoys no such access.
Criminal procedure jurisprudence embraces the obvious: a “diary’s author
enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.”127 As such, the
police must obtain a warrant before intruding upon such intimacies.128 One
117

Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL 4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17,

2008).
118

Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515, 1998 WL 341812, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1998).
Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2008); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
120
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 361 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 500
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
121
Zises v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 112 F.R.D. 223, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
122
Simpson, 220 F.R.D. at 361.
123
Hollingworth v. Hollingworth, 145 P.2d 466, 466–67 (Ore. 1944)
124
Federal and state courts have compelled defendants to produce their private diaries to opposing
counsel or the court for inspection. E.g., Kalima v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C 06-1503 SI,
2007 WL 1514785, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2007); Dogan Entrs., Inc. v. Hubsher, No. CV-84-3984,
1987 WL 20312, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1987); In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 99 F.R.D.
616, 626 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Chang-Craft v. Cameron, No. 3AN-05-13737, 2006 WL 6886441, at *1
(Alaska Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2006); Robinson v. Robinson, 764 N.Y.S.2d 93, 93–94 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003); Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002);
Hollingworth, 145 P.2d at 466–67; King v. Fimia, No. 06-2-00803-1 SEA, 2007 WL 4350387, at *1
(Wash. Super. Ct. June 5, 2007).
125
Federal and state courts have compelled plaintiffs to produce their private diaries to opposing
counsel or the court for inspection. E.g., Hawkins v. St. Clair Cnty., No. 07-142-DRH-CJP, 2008 WL
4279994, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008); Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Cov. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL
126594, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008); Simpson, 220 F.R.D. at 360–62; Gill v. Beaver, No. CIV. A.
98-3569, 1999 WL 461821, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 1999); Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97 C 6515,
1998 WL 341812, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1998); Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476,
477 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Eidukonis v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 86-5142, 1987 WL 9286, at *2–3 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 9, 1987); Zises, 112 F.R.D. at 224–25.
126
One might contend that plaintiffs should be treated differently than defendants because, by
bringing a suit, a plaintiff forfeits some of her privacy rights. I reject this contention because “the right
of access to courts for redress of wrongs is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
government.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–97 (1984). One should not be compelled to
forfeit one constitutional right in order to exercise another.
127
In re Application of U.S. for a Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736
F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1362
(D.D.C. 1981) (“[P]risoners ‘have and should have’ a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of a personal diary.” (quoting Diguiseppe v. Ward, 514 F. Supp. 503, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d in
part, 698 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983))).
128
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 10 (1977)).
119
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who finds herself on the receiving end of a civil summons or subpoena
should enjoy the same rights as those suspected of perpetrating crimes. To
paraphrase the Bard, a search “by any other name,” is still a search.129
III. THE FRCP’S DOCUMENT PRODUCTION RULES DO NOT EMPLOY
SUFFICIENT RIGOR TO SATISFY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT
That the compulsory production of private papers constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search is, of course, merely the beginning of our inquiry. The
Amendment does not bar searches; “it merely prohibits searches . . . that
are ‘unreasonable.’”130 “Reasonable searches are permitted.”131
The California Supreme Court squarely addressed the reasonableness
of civil document production orders in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Court.132 The court acknowledged that the compelled production of
documents sometimes constitutes a search,133 but concluded that such
searches are reasonable because modern discovery rules regulate
production orders in a manner analogous to the issuance of search
warrants.134 “[J]ust as search warrants are justifiable on the showing of
good cause,” Greyhound asserted, “so an order for the inspection of
material in a civil case is reasonable when similar provision is made.”135
Other courts have accepted this argument.136
129

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
131
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 364 P.2d 266, 287 (Cal. 1961), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Stats. 1963, ch. 1744, § 1 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018.030 (West
(2012)). In Greyhound, the defendant sought to avoid compliance with a trial court’s documentproduction order, asserting that such orders when made “without reference to its admissibility”
constitute unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 286. In support of its argument, the defendant
relied on California opinions predating Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), recognizing that the
court-ordered production of private papers constituted unreasonable searches and seizures. Greyhound,
364 P.2d at 286 (citing McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 159 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1945)).
Greyhound overruled these opinions, holding that modern discovery statutes render documentproduction orders reasonable per se. Id. at 286–87. In an unrelated portion of its opinion, the court
also rejected the defendant’s contention that documents sought by the plaintiff were protected by the
work-product doctrine. Id. at 290–92. Following the decision, the California Legislature amended one
of the state’s discovery laws to amplify work-product protections. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2018.030 (West (2012), noted in Coito v. Superior Court, 278 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012). But
Greyhound’s finding that modern discovery rules render document-production orders immune to
Fourth Amendment challenges remains good law. See Coito, 278 P.3d at 864–68 (noting that statutory
amendments have bolstered the work-product protections recognized by California law, but making no
reference to Greyhound’s Fourth Amendment holding).
132
Greyhound, 364 P.2d at 287.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
See, e.g., Gen. Petrol. Corp. v. Dist. Court of the U.S. for Western Dist. of Wash., 213 F.2d
689, 692 (9th Cir. 1954) (finding that compliance with FRCP rendered a document production order
130
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The flaw in the Greyhound court’s logic is that the limits imposed by
the FRCP and state discovery rules do not even remotely compare to those
imposed by the warrant clause. Search warrants are not premised on mere
good cause, but upon a showing of probable cause.137 This standard,
which has “roots that are deep in our history, represent[s] the accumulated
wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification
necessary to make” searches and seizures “reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”138
The government bears the burden of establishing the existence of
probable cause.139 The assessment of whether the government has met its
burden calls for “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence . . . will be found in a particular place.”140 In determining
whether a search warrant should issue, magistrate judges must
independently evaluate the evidence offered, probing “the veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge” of its source.141
In the criminal procedure context, the probable cause requirement
significantly protects the expectation of privacy inherent in one’s private
papers. As one commentator observed: “Requiring a showing of probable
cause as to the existence of the [individual’s private] papers and their
evidentiary relationship with a crime would seem to provide almost
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes); Rekeweg v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431, 437–38
(N.D. Ind. 1961) (finding that because the documents sought were “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence” a defendant’s assertion that a production demand constituted
“unreasonable search and seizure” was defeated); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 57,
58 (D.N.Y. 1939) (finding a mere “showing of materiality” by the party demanding documents was
sufficient to render a production order reasonable under the Fourth Amendment), rev’d on other
grounds, 334 U.S. 258, 264–65 (1948). But see Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928)
(finding a well-pleaded complaint was insufficient to show probable cause for authorizing a search).
137
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
138
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized two principal
exceptions to the rule that probable cause is required to make a search or seizure reasonable: limited,
protective searches based on reasonable suspicion of imminent danger, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968), and searches incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). See Eric
J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1, 61
(2010) (“The only exception to the prohibition on searches, absent traditional probable cause, is a very
narrow and definite one: officer safety.”). Both Terry and Chimel represent very narrow exceptions
designed to protect law enforcement officers from attacks from persons the officer reasonably suspects
to be dangerous. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983). This consideration is wholly
absent in the context of the compelled production of private papers.
139
United States v. Andrews, 454 F.3d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 2006).
140
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
141
United States v. Archibald, 685 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2012); accord United States v.
McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir.
1996).
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complete protection against the seizure of those papers that ‘constitute an
integral aspect of a person’s private enclave.’”142
While probable cause is “a standard well short of absolute
certainty,”143 it is significantly more stringent than that imposed on civil
litigants seeking document production orders. All a litigant needs to do to
“unlock the doors of discovery” is file a complaint endowed with “wellpleaded factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.”144 When this modest obligation is met, Rules 26 and 34 of the
FRCP direct courts to compel the production of any papers that are
“relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”145
The reach of “discovery is not limited to matters that will be
admissible at trial,”146 but extends to demands that facially appear to be
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”147
Importantly, the Federal Rules “do not distinguish between public and
private information.”148 Further, Rule 26’s requirement of relevancy “is to
be construed broadly, and material is relevant if it bears on, or reasonably
could bear on, an issue that is or may be involved [in] the litigation.”149
The FRCP thus empowers litigants “to obtain—incidentally or
purposefully—information that not only is irrelevant [to the action] but if
publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.”150
In sharp contrast to “the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge”
analysis used to seize documentary evidence in the criminal justice
arena,151 the FRCP requires courts assessing civil document requests to
“assume [the] veracity” of pleaded accusations.152 It permits no inquiry
regarding the basis of knowledge underlying a litigant’s factual claims.153
Allegations premised entirely upon “information and belief” will suffice.154

142
McKenna, supra note 31, at 74 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 427 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
143
Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam).
144
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
145
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Colo. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1)), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, Rule 37 dictates “that
if . . . a party refuses to obey an order compelling discovery, the court may impose sanctions against
that individual, including, where appropriate, dismissal of the action.” Jones v. Niagara Frontier
Transp. Auth., 836 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)).
146
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1984) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
147
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
148
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.
149
Topol v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
150
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.
151
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
152
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
153
Id. at 679.
154
See, e.g., Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 676 F.3d 318, 327–28 (3d Cir.
2012) (referring to a lower court’s decision to permit further discovery on information and belief); Tri-
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It is settled law in the criminal arena that accusations made on
“information and belief” fall far short of satisfying the probable cause
standard.155 By definition, such allegations do not “state the facts upon
which the belief is based.”156 As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “[C]ourts
will not permit the evasion of the Constitution by [issuing warrants] on
sworn declarations, . . . which fail to establish probable cause, inasmuch as
they state the facts on information and belief . . . instead of positively
alleging the material facts.”157 Thus, the basic assumption of Greyhound
and like opinions that civil discovery rules limit production orders in a
manner analogous to the issuance of search warrants is fallacious.
IV. A PARTY SEEKING TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF PRIVATE PAPERS
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE
DOCUMENTS SOUGHT WILL YIELD ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
The expansive discovery permitted by the FRCP and state statutes was
wholly unknown when the Fourth Amendment was ratified.158 For the first
century and a half of United States jurisprudence—before the adoption of
the FRCP in 1938159—“the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issueformulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily . . . by the
pleadings.”160 Courts held fast to the common-law rule that “discovery
sought upon suspicion, surmise or vague guesses [was] called a fishing
bill, and [would] be dismissed.”161 Compulsory pre-trial document
production was barred,162 and to compel the production of a document
during trial, federal law required the litigant to prove to the court both that
“the document sought contain[ed] evidence pertinent to [a disputed]
issue”163 and was “material to the support of the complainant’s own
case.”164
Star Theme Builders, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 426 Fed. App’x 506, 514 (9th Cir. 2011) (referring to
an appellant’s pleadings, made upon information and belief, that allowed for further discovery).
155
Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
156
Carden v. Ensminger, 161 N.E. 137, 141 (Ill. 1928).
157
Schencks, 2 F.2d at 187.
158
See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911) (finding compelled pre-trial production of
documents was forbidden prior to FRCP); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed:
The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691–93 (1998)
(discussing limited reach of pre-FRCP discovery).
159
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 595 n.14 (2007) (quoting Easterbrook, supra note
9, at 645).
160
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
161
Carpenter, 221 U.S. at 540.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Id. at 540. Pursuant to pre-FRCP practice, the production of a document could be compelled
when “the document sought contain[ed] evidence pertinent to the issue, and in cases and under
circumstances when they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules or proceeding
in chancery.” Id. at 537–38. The rules of chancery dictated that “a bill must seek only evidence which
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The power granted to litigants by the FRCP is not only unprecedented
in U.S. history, but it is also unknown elsewhere in the free world. “[N]o
other country—common law or civil law—has any system of discovery
approaching that provided for in the [FRCP].”165 Around the world, “there
is widespread disapproval of pretrial discovery of documents as that
discovery is conducted in U.S. courts.”166 At least fifteen nations have
enacted “blocking statutes” barring compliance with discovery orders
issued by American courts.167
Despite these criticisms, I am not advocating for a return to the preFRCP regime. Compelled document production, like police-executed
search warrants, serves the public’s interest in the “determination of
truth.”168 But the compelled production of private papers and the execution
of warrants both involve searches. Thus, I posit that both should be
brought into alignment with the concept of probable cause—the standard
that “represent[s] the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as
to the minimum justification necessary to make” searches and seizures
“reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”169
This does not mean the end of the compulsory production of
documents, but instead merely means the end of the virtually unfettered
access to an opponent’s private papers currently authorized by the FRCP.
A litigant seeking discovery of such papers—like a constable seeking a
search warrant—should bear the burden of establishing that “there is a fair
probability” that the documents sought will yield admissible evidence.170
Probable cause, while much more stringent than the criterion for
disclosure currently imposed by Rule 26, is “a standard well short of
absolute certainty.”171 In assessing whether a moving party has satisfied
this burden, the court should assess the “veracity” of his allegations and his
is material to the support of the complainant’s own case, and prying into the nature of his adversary’s
case [would] not be tolerated.” Id. at 540. While these limitations only applied in federal courts, state
discovery laws authorizing court-ordered document production were inapplicable in federal court, even
in diversity cases. Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 720–25 (1885). Further, state laws authorizing
discovery of private papers would not have been subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny because the
Amendment was not applied to the states until 1949. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949)
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment applicable to state governments), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655–57 (1961).
165
Mullenix, supra note 9, at 6.
166
Weintraub, supra note 9, at 420 (citing British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1985] 1 A.C.
58 (H.L.), at 78).
167
Id.
168
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
169
Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
171
Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615 (2007) (per curiam).
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“basis of knowledge.” As with the issuance of search warrants, this does
not mean that a movant’s allegations “must be seen and weighed . . . in
terms of library analysis by scholars.”173 Rather, it entails a “totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced assessment of the
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)
attending” a movant’s pleaded accusations.174 If the movant’s allegations
provide the court with a “substantial basis” for concluding that the papers
sought will yield admissible evidence, then the probable cause standard has
been satisfied and their production should be compelled.175
A majority of litigants will be able to satisfy this “flexible standard,”176
and it should only apply to demands for documents embodying a
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”177 But when this standard is
applicable, it cannot be satisfied by the naked surmise of “information and
belief” allegations.178
The application of this standard will strike the proper balance between
litigants’ interests in the “determination of truth” and the “the protection of
Fourth Amendment values”179—i.e., the prohibition of “unjustifiable
intrusion[s] . . . upon the privacy of the individual.”180 Of course, applying
this standard may shield some unsavory conduct from scrutiny, but that is
the price of the Fourth Amendment. “[T]here is nothing new in the
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the [wrongdoing] of a
few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”181
V. COURTS SHOULD ISSUE PROTECTIVE ORDERS BARRING THE
DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE PAPERS PRODUCED
DURING DISCOVERY TO THE MEDIA
Following the advent of the FRCP, courts grappled with the question
of whether the First Amendment commands that information obtained
through discovery be available to the media for publication.182 After nearly
172

Gates, 462 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 231–32 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
174
Id. at 234.
175
Id. at 239.
176
Id.
177
See supra text accompanying note 90.
178
See cases cited supra note 38.
179
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
180
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); accord
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 n.10 (1972) (quoting Justice Brandeis’s text approvingly).
181
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (White, J., concurring).
182
Compare In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 182–83, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the First
Amendment barred the court from issuing a protective order preventing media disclosure of materials
received in discovery process), with Nichols v. Phila. Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89, 92 (E.D. Pa. 1958)
(permitting plaintiff to file documents under seal).
173
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a half century of tumult, the Supreme Court resolved this question in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.183 Concluding that “discovery may
seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties,” the
Court held that the Constitution permits courts to issue protective orders
prohibiting parties from publicly disseminating information obtained in
discovery.184
The Court reasoned that discovery “is provided for the sole purpose of
assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated
disputes.”185 Despite this limited purpose, the Court recognized that
modern discovery mechanisms can be easily abused. The FRCP empowers
“litigants to obtain—incidentally or purposefully—information that not
only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation
and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial interest in
preventing this sort of abuse of its processes.”186 For this reason, the Court
concluded that “[t]he prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced
production of information under a . . . discovery rule is sufficient
justification for the authorization of protective orders.”187
Despite the clarity of the Seattle Times ruling, few lower courts seem
Several courts continue to recognize a
to have taken notice.188
“presumption that discovery materials are open to public inspection,”
permitting dissemination of such information to the media.189
Furthermore, significant lower court case law “suggests that even when a
party admittedly seeks [to use information obtained during discovery] to
publicly embarrass his opponent, no protection should issue absent
evidence of substantial embarrassment or harm.”190
This precedent not only ignores Seattle Times, but it does not accord
with the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Wilson v.
Layne,191 the Court addressed whether the First Amendment empowers
police to invite media representatives to accompany them while they
execute search warrants.192 In Wilson, police invited a Washington Post
183

467 U.S. 20 (1984).
Id. at 34–37.
185
Id. at 34.
186
Id. at 35.
187
Id. at 35–36.
188
See Cooper, supra note 16, at 776 (“Seattle Times has been sometimes sidestepped,
occasionally ignored, and often overwhelmed by the rigorous good cause findings required by lower
federal court decisions.” (footnotes omitted)).
189
Flaherty v. Seroussi, 209 F.R.D. 295, 297–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); accord Mathias v. Jacobs, 197
F.R.D. 29, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hawley v. Hall, 131 F.R.D. 578, 581 (D. Nev. 1990).
190
Burgess v. Town of Wallingford, No. 3:11-CV-1129 (CSH), 2012 WL 4344194, at *11 (D.
Conn. Sept. 21, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Pia v. Supernova Media, Inc., 275
F.R.D. 559, 561–62 (D. Utah 2011); Flaherty, 209 F.R.D. at 299; Hawley, 131 F.R.D. at 584–85.
191
526 U.S. 603 (1999).
192
Id. at 612–13.
184
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reporter and photographer to accompany them during the execution of a
warrant to arrest the petitioners’ son and search their home.193 Because the
officers possessed a warrant, the Court noted that “they were undoubtedly
entitled to enter [the petitioners’] home . . . . But it does not necessarily
follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them.”194 The execution of warrants necessarily entail a
significant invasion of privacy. “Valid warrants will issue to search the
innocent, and [such] people . . . unfortunately bear the cost. Officers
executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are
engaged in private activity; and the resulting frustration, embarrassment,
and humiliation may be real . . . .”195
The Wilson Court reasoned that officers may not unnecessarily
magnify this humiliation by exposing private information to the media.196
The Fourth Amendment “require[s] that police actions in execution of a
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”197 The
reporters and photographers did not meet this limitation, as their presence
was not related to the warrant: “[T]he reporters did not engage in the
execution of the warrant, and did not assist the police in their task. The
reporters therefore were not present for any reason related to the
justification for police entry into the home . . . .”198 The Court concluded:
[I]t is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to
bring members of the media or other third parties into a home
during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the
third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of
the warrant.199
Wilson provides instruction with respect to civil document production
orders. Both the execution of search warrants and the compelled
production of private papers involve the exposure of “private activity”
threatening significant “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation.”200
Such embarrassment—when based on a showing of probable cause—may
be outweighed by “the public interest in determination of truth at trial.”201
But as both Wilson and Seattle Times recognize, the humiliation resulting
from such intrusions should not be magnified by allowing unnecessary
193

Id. at 606–07.
Id. at 611.
195
Los Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615–16 (2007) (per curiam).
196
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–14.
197
Id. at 611.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 614.
200
See Rettele, 550 U.S. at 615–16 (describing the undesired side effects accompanying the
execution of search warrants); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 (1984)
(“[D]iscovery . . . may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties.”).
201
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
194
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202

third parties to view this material.
Of course, the First Amendment requires that private papers actually
received into evidence be made available to the public.203 This does not
make the contents of private papers produced in discovery presumptively
public. The purpose of discovery is to assist “in the preparation and trial,
or the settlement, of litigated disputes.”204 A litigant’s use of this
information, like an officer’s execution of a warrant, should be restricted
“to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.”205
The Fourth Amendment bars police from bringing third parties with
them during the execution of warrants unless those parties are needed to
“assist the police in their task.”206 For the same reason, courts should issue
protective orders limiting disclosure of the contents of private papers
received in discovery to third parties who assist litigants or counsel in their
task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since their advent in 1938, the FRCP’s expansive discovery provisions
have fundamentally transformed civil litigation. Gone are the days of
dramatic courtroom triumphs. For the modern litigator, “victory is not in
the scathing cross [examination], but in the tedious review of
documents.”207 The battle for documents “is the numbing, ditch-digging
work that determines the winner.”208
Discovery serves the public’s interest in arriving at the truth. But the
expansive power to compel the production of private papers that the FRCP
conveys enables litigants to intrude into “sphere[s] in which society
recognizes reasonable expectations of privacy.”209 Under this standard,
nothing is sacred, and no detail is too intimate to shield it from scrutiny.
The compelled production of private papers constitutes a quintessential
Fourth Amendment search. Yet, the FRCP bestows upon civil litigants the
power to compel disclosure of such documents virtually as a matter of
right. I do not contend that compelled document production should be
wholly eliminated. While the disclosure of private papers necessarily
202

Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611–14; Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.
See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586–88, 595–600 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the First Amendment prohibits judicial restraints on media coverage of
trials).
204
Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34.
205
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611.
206
Id.
207
Discovery, 23 LITIGATION 5 (1997).
208
Id.
209
United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 1991); accord California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
203
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threatens significant “frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation,” the
same intrusions attend the execution of search warrants.210 I simply assert
that like search warrants, orders compelling the production of private
papers should be premised on a threshold showing of probable cause. The
failure to apply this standard to invasions of privacy outside the realm of
criminal procedure gives parties “more leeway” to litigate often trivial
personal matters than it gives the government to “enforc[e] laws against
rape or murder.”211
While probable cause is much more stringent than the bar for
disclosure currently imposed by the FRCP, it is “a standard well short of
If the moving party’s pleaded allegations
absolute certainty.”212
demonstrate that “there is a fair probability” that the papers sought will
yield admissible evidence, then the probable cause standard has been
satisfied and their production should be compelled.213 A majority of
litigants will be able to satisfy this “flexible, easily applied standard.”214
But its application will thwart many of the “fishing expeditions” currently
permitted by the FRCP.215
The Supreme Court itself promulgated the FRCP. Thus, acceptance of
my argument requires the Court to do something it has never done before:
acknowledge that its own actions violated the Constitution.216 “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”217 With this charge comes the responsibility to exercise the
humility and detachment necessary to recognize that it, like its coordinate
branches of government, is not infallible. I can think of no greater
endorsement of America’s tripartite system of government than a Supreme
Court decision recognizing this fact.218
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216
See Robert K. Harris, Comment, Brown v. Nichols: The Eleventh Circuit Refuses to Play the
Erie Game with Georgia’s Expert Affidavit Requirement, 29 GA. L. REV. 291, 300 n.54 (1994) (citing
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–74 (1965)) (noting that Supreme Court regards the FRCP as
entitled to “presumptive validity” and that the Court has never found any Rule it promulgated
unconstitutional).
217
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
218
To complete the metaphor of this Essay, I note that such an opinion may be “a far, far better
thing” than the Court “ha[s] ever done.” DICKENS, supra note 19, at 390.
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